What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers?
Introduction
What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? Are more philosophers theists or atheists? Physicalists or non-physicalists? Deontologists, consequentialists, or virtue ethicists? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine the answers to these and other questions. This article documents the results.
Why should the answers to these sociological questions be of interest to philosophers or to anyone else? First, they have obvious sociological and historical interest.
Philosophy as practiced is a human activity, and philosophers have a strong interest in the character of this human activity, past and present. Historians of philosophy are interested in the dominant philosophical views of various eras, and in how these views changed over time. Contemporary philosophy can be seen as the leading edge of the history of philosophy, and a proper understanding of today's philosophical views can feed into an understanding of historical trends. Furthermore, today's sociology is tomorrow's history, and one can reasonably hope that answers to these sociological questions will be of some use to the historians of the future.
Second, one could argue that these sociological facts can play an evidential role in answering philosophical questions. On this view, the prevalence of views among philosophers can serve as a guide to their truth. After all, philosophers had had the benefit of years of reflection on these questions and might be taken as experts on them.
In science, we often take the prevalence of scientific views among experts as strong evidence about which views are correct (consider questions about evolution or climate change, for example). It could be suggested that expert views should play a similar role with respect to philosophical questions. Many will be skeptical about this analogy, however. It is arguable that there is less convergence over time in philosophy than in science, for example. So we do not make the evidential claim here.
Third, it is clear that sociological views play a methodological role within the practice of philosophy. In philosophical discussion it is inevitable that some views are presupposed, other views are the focus of attention and argument, while still others are ignored.
At a given time in a given community, some views have the status of "received wisdom".
These views are often used as premises of arguments, and if they are rejected, it is usually acknowledged that doing so requires argument. Other views are often ignored or set aside without argument. When they are acknowledged, they are rarely used as premises of arguments. To assert them requires considerable justification.
One might suggest that the received wisdom within a given community is determined by what most people in the community believe: views that are widely accepted require less argument than views that are widely rejected. A moment's reflection, however, suggests that received wisdom is more likely to be determined by what most people believe most people believe. If most members of a community mistakenly believe that most members believe p, then it is more likely that assertions of p rather than assertions of ¬p will receive default status. If most philosophers believe that most philosophers are physicalists when in fact most philosophers are dualists, for example, then the norms of the community will typically require that asserting dualism requires more argument than asserting physicalism.
Insofar as sociological beliefs play this role within philosophy, it is better for them to be accurate. For example: suppose that a philosopher accepts the analytic-synthetic distinction and thinks the arguments against it fail. Suppose that she is writing an article in which she thinks that (sociology aside) an appeal to the distinction would strengthen the article. Suppose that she nevertheless does not appeal to the distinction in the article, solely on the grounds that she thinks a large majority of philosophers reject the distinction. Suppose that in fact, a large majority of philosophers accept the distinction. Then her decision will have been grounded in a false sociological belief, and the article will be weaker by her own lights as a result. True sociological beliefs would put her in a position to write a better article by her own lights.
Spurred by this sociological, historical, and methodological interest, we conducted a survey of the views of professional philosophers in late 2009. The PhilPapers Survey surveyed professional philosophers worldwide about their views on thirty key philosophical questions. We also surveyed them on demographic questions concerning gender, age, nationality, and areas of specialization. This allows more reliable answers than previously available about the views of professional philosophers and about how they vary with the various demographic factors, yielding a richer picture of the philosophical character of the contemporary philosophical community.
We simultaneously conducted the PhilPapers Metasurvey, asking philosophers for their predictions about the distribution of answers to the PhilPapers Survey. This metasurvey allowed us to measure the accuracy of philosophers' sociological beliefs about views within the field. It also provides a measure of just how surprising or unsurprising are the results of the PhilPapers Survey. To foreshadow the results that follow, we found that many of the results are quite surprising, both on an individual and a community level. The sociological beliefs of individual philosophers are typically quite inaccurate, and the community as a whole substantially overestimates or underestimates the popularity of a number of important philosophical positions. By rectifying these inaccurate sociological beliefs, the PhilPapers Survey provides a useful corrective to those aspects of the practice of philosophy that are grounded in them.
It should be noted that this study is not a work of philosophy. For the most part, we are not putting forward philosophical theses or arguing for them. It is also not a work of science. We are not putting forward scientific hypotheses or testing them. Instead it is a data-gathering exercise in the sociology of philosophy. We do not exclude the possibility, however, that the sociological data we have gathered might be used as inputs to philosophical or to scientific work in the future.
Setup and methodology
The PhilPapers Survey was conducted online from November 8, 2009 to December 1, 2009 . The Metasurvey begun immediately after the Survey and ended on December 8, 2009. We begin by describing the setup and methodology of the Survey and the Metasurvey. We will then describe and discuss the main results of the two surveys.
Survey population
Ideally, a survey such as this one would be sent to every professional philosopher in the world. However, it is not easy to determine just who is in this group and to gather contact details for this group. National philosophical associations typically do not give out contact details for their members, for example.
Instead, we chose as a target group all regular faculty members in 99 leading departments of philosophy. These include the 86 Ph.D.-granting departments in Englishspeaking countries rated 1.9 or above in the Philosophical Gourmet Report. They also include ten departments in non-English-speaking countries (all from continental Europe) and three non-Ph-D.-granting departments. These thirteen departments were chosen in consultation with the editor of the Gourmet Report and a number of other philosophers, on the grounds of their having strength in analytic philosophy comparable to the other 86 departments. The overall list included 62 departments in the US, 18 in the UK, 10 in Europe outside the UK, 7 in Canada, and 5 in Australasia.
It should be acknowledged that this target group has a strong (although not exclusive) bias toward analytic or Anglocentric philosophy. As a consequence, the results of the survey are a much better guide to what analytic/Anglocentric philosophers (or at least philosophers in strong analytic/Anglocentric departments believe) believe than to what philosophers from other traditions believe. We conceived of the survey that way from the start, in part because that is where our own expertise lies. It is also not clear how much can be learned by requiring (for example) specialists in Anglocentric philosophy to answer questions drawn from Asian philosophy or vice versa. Furthermore, attempting full representation of philosophers worldwide from all traditions would require linguistic resources and contact details that were unavailable to us.
To determine the membership of the target group, we used faculty lists drawn from the Gourmet Report, supplemented with information from department websites. The final target group included 1,972 philosophers. A research assistant compiled e-mail addresses from departmental websites. Every member of the target group was sent an initial email invitation to take the survey, and additional email requests after one week and two weeks if they had not yet responded.
In addition to inviting the target group, we allowed anyone to take the survey, including professional philosophers from other departments, students, and others. The Survey was advertised to all registered PhilPapers users (approximately 15,000 users at the time) through one direct email announcement, and was also announced on the PhilPapers website and in other places on the web. This group is less well-controlled than the target group, however, so we concentrate mainly on results from the target group in what follows.
Main questions and survey interface
The main part of the PhilPapers Philosophical Survey consisted of thirty philosophical questions plus additional background questions. Each of the thirty philosophical questions was presented along with multiple choice answers as shown in Figure 1 .
The thirty philosophical questions asked, and the answers proposed, were the following: The order in which the questions were presented was randomized for each respondent.
The order in which the answer options were presented was also randomized.
Respondents could indicate that they "accept" or "lean toward" any of the options mentioned in the question (see Figure 1 ). They could also choose one of a number of other responses or could skip the question using a link provided. These additional possible responses were as follows (with minor variations for non-binary questions 1 ):
• Accept both The questions and the response options were determined by three rounds of beta testing with about fifty philosophers from various fields in the weeks before the survey was conducted. The questions focus on widely discussed topics within analytic philosophy.
(It was apparent from an early stage that continental philosophy does not lend itself easily to the survey format.) We decided on the format involving brief labels for three reasons. First, spelling out the views at more length would require many more arbitrary choices on the part of the survey designers. Second, although many of these labels are ambiguous, longer descriptions would introduce new ambiguities in turn. Third, it was inevitable that the results would be reported using brief labels ("n% of philosophers are Platonists"), and these reports would be least misleading if the labels themselves were used in posing the questions.
The questions focus especially in five "core" areas of analytic philosophy, in part because these appeared to be the most accessible to philosophers outside the area. There are five questions from each of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind, and three from the philosophy of language. There is also one question each from aesthetics, decision theory, logic, metaphilosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of science, and political philosophy.
Of course there were numerous arbitrary decisions in deciding on both questions and options. The survey designers allowed themselves one "pet question" each (questions 21 and 30 respectively) on their own research areas. The wording for a number of questions (those on aesthetics, personal identity, and truth, for example) underwent considerable refinement in response to feedback during the beta testing process. It was particularly difficult to formulate a question within political philosophy: the most obvious questions involved "liberalism", but this term is too ambiguous in an international context to be useful. We would have liked to have included questions from the philosophy of gender and race and from the history of philosophy, but it proved difficult to find questions that worked in the survey format. For more discussion of the choice of questions, see the survey's web site. 2
Orientation and background questions
Respondents were also asked to provide information on their philosophical orientation and on various background properties. They were asked the following questions about philosophical orientation: • Philosophical tradition. Respondents could choose either "analytic", "continental" or "other." When selecting "other" they could enter a tradition as free text.
• For which nonliving philosophers X would you describe yourself or your work as X-ian, or the equivalent? List in order, and choose "other" to specify a new option. Respondents were also asked the following background questions:
• Year of birth • Nationality
• Gender (male or female)
• Doctorate in philosophy (respondents could indicate that they hold a doctorate in philosophy, and specify the granting institution and year).
• Primary affiliation and secondary affiliation (respondents could specify the institution, discipline, and their role: undergraduate student, graduate student, postdoc, research staff, faculty, or administrator)
The Survey was anonymous. Under consent guidelines approved by the ANU Human Ethics Panel, respondents were told how their answers would be used, and at the end of the survey were asked to consent to the use of their answers.
Metasurvey questions and interface
In the Metasurvey, respondents had to estimate what percentages of respondents in the primary target population would either accept or lean toward any of the main positions mentioned in the Survey. For the question on a priori knowledge, for example (question #1 above), respondents had to assign percentages to the following three sets of responses:
• Accept: yes, Lean toward: yes Respondents therefore had to specify three percentages for each question. The Metasurvey interface is shown in Figure 2 . Answer options were randomized wherever they appeared. Respondents were explained the nature and sampling method of the target group at the beginning of the Metasurvey.
Main Survey Results
931 of the 1,972 members of the target faculty group completed the Survey (a 47% response rate). Including the uncontrolled survey group, 3,226 individuals from all populations completed the survey. The following list summarizes the results for the target faculty group, collapsing answers that "accept" and "lean toward" for a given view and collapsing all "other" answers. More fine-grained results can be found in Appendix 1. Figure 3 shows the distribution of ages among the respondents from the target faculty group who provided their age. 77.2% of respondents specified "male" as gender, 17.4% specified "female," and 5.3% did not specify a gender.
Demographics of target faculty
There are three geographical parameters in the survey: nationality, location of Ph.D. department, and location of current affiliation. For simplicity we group locations into six main groups: Australasia, Canada, (continental) Europe, UK, US, and Other. The target faculty who provided this information break down as indicated in Table 1 
Correlations
The surveys revealed a number of interesting correlations between answers to the 30 main questions and demographic factors such as gender, age, and geographical location.
For each main view on each main question, we converted the answer to that question to a score (+2 for accepting the view, +1 for leaning toward it, -1 for leaning toward another view, and -2 for accepting another view). "Other" answers were treated as indicated in For the 21 binary questions, the scores for the two main views will be perfectly correlated (one is the negation of the other) so we need only focus on one view in each case. We summarize and discuss the correlations we found in what follows.
To illustrate the significance of the correlations reported, take the correlation coefficient between metaphilosophical naturalism and non-cognitivism about moral judgments, which is .204. This coefficient is derived from the distribution of answers summarized in Instead, we take the correlations to be of sociological interest in their own right.
Correlations between philosophical views
The survey revealed many correlations between philosophical views. The highest correlations are summarized in Table 4 . Many more correlations are available on the Survey site. 4 
Gender correlations
Gender is correlated with a number of views. The strongest correlations (positive correlations indicate a correlation with being female) are shown in Table 5 . Correlations between gender and background questions and philosophical orientation can be found on the survey's website. Most of these correlations were less than 0.1, except for a 0.22 correlation with Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality and a -0.10 correlation with Metaphysics.
Age correlations
We found a number of significant correlations between year of birth and philosophical views. The strongest correlations are summarized in Table 6 : Main correlations between year of birth and main answers.
Geographical correlations
In general, birth location, PhD location, and current location are strongly correlated in unsurprising ways, and all three exhibit fairly similar correlations with philosophical answers. We list results for current affiliation in Table 7 ; the other results can be found on the web. Table 7 : Highest correlations between main answers and geographic affiliations Table 8 shows the main correlations between areas of specialization and philosophical views. It is also interesting to compare the answers of individuals specializing in areas relevant to a question with those not specializing in these areas. We will refer to these groups as "specialists" and "non-specialists," respectively. In comparing specialist and non-specialist answers, we ignore "other" answers and normalize the other answers so they sum to 100%. This is necessary because answers such as "insufficiently familiar with the issue" vary significantly between specialists and non-specialists for reasons that are independent of what we want to measure. After normalization, the mean absolute difference between the percentages of specialist and non-specialist answers is 9.31% across all questions, with a standard deviation of 11.53%. Table 9 shows the answers exhibiting differences greater than the mean. These results suggest that there is such a thing as specialist opinion in philosophy, whether or not specialists are more likely to be right. Table 9 : Greatest differences between specialists and non-specialists Interestingly, specialists were more likely than non-specialists to reject the choice between the main alternatives given. One might count the following "other" answers as rejecting choices: "The question is too unclear to answer," "Accept another alternative,"
Specialization correlations
"Accept an intermediate view," "Accept both," "There is no fact of the matter," "Reject both," "Accept more than one," "Reject all." Across all questions, specialists reject choices 15.4% of the time compared to 12.2% for non-specialists. Nine questions have choices rejected by more than 20% of specialists: the dichotomies involving empiricism and rationalism (38.8%), objectivism and subjectivism about aesthetic value (36.9%), internalism and externalism about epistemic justification (25%) and about mental con-tent (24%), Fregeanism and Millianism about proper names (23.4%), scientific realism and anti-realism (22.4%), and classical and non-classical logic (20.6%); and the trichotomies involving communitarianism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism in political philosophy (33%) and physical, biological, and further-fact views of personal identity (22.7%) . These high rejection rates suggest that finer or clearer distinctions may be especially useful in these debates.
Identification effects
The highest correlations between philosophical views and identification with past philosophers are listed in Table 10 . Respondents were also asked whether they identify with the analytic tradition, the continental tradition, or another tradition. We converted these answers into an analytic/continental variable (1 for analytic, 0 for other, -1 for continental) in order to calculate correlations with other variables. The strongest relationships with philosophical views are as shown in Table 11 . 
Factor analysis
To better understand these correlations, we performed exploratory factor analyses (Spearman 1904 , Gorsuch 1983 and principal component analyses (Pearson 1901 , Jolliffe 2002 on the target faculty responses using a range of methods. The aim of both of these types of statistical analyses is to isolate a relatively small number of factors or components (we will use these terms interchangeably) that can be used to predict as much as pos-sible of the variation in a larger number of observed variables (in this case, answers to survey questions). Any given factor is a linear combination of the observed variables.
The numerical loading for each variable is the correlation between the factor and the Table 13 : Components extracted using principal component analysis with varimax rotation. Only loadings of a magnitude .25 or more are shown. The variables are grouped according to their main contributions to extracted components. The bold headings give our interpretations of the first five components. Table 13 shows the components we extracted using principal component analysis. A varimax rotation (which produces mutually uncorrelated factors that tend to be highly loaded on a limited number of variables) was applied. We restricted the analysis to 30 answers in total (one per question). Some answers were combined: relativism and contextualism were combined, as were idealism and skepticism. Otherwise, the number of answers was reduced by eliminating one or more answer per question. This was necessary in order to remove uninteresting dependencies between answers. The number of extracted components was restricted to seven. 5 Similar results were obtained using five different factor analysis methods and other rotations. 6 The first five factors extracted and the relative importance of their component variables were essentially the same in all cases except for small variations in the order of the factors. Factor analysis and principal component analysis yield different results only for the sixth and seventh factors, and the sixth and seventh factors extracted by factor analysis are still similar to those displayed in Table 13 . The factors depend on the choice of survey questions, so we do not claim that these seven factors represent the most important factors underlying philosophical views in general, but they appear to be robustly linked to the answers to the thirty main questions surveyed here.
While interpreting the results of such analyses is inherently difficult, the first five components showed in Table 13 are not too hard to characterize. The first component, dominated by theism, a rejection of naturalism, libertarianism about free will, and non-physicalism about the mind, seems to be reflect rejection of a naturalistic world view. The second component combines realism and cognitivism about moral judgements with objectivism about aesthetic values. It is also associated with Platonism and a non-Humean view of causation. It seems to reflect a propensity to acknowledge the objectivity of normative and evaluative facts and the reality of controversial entities in ontology. The third component combines a priori knowledge, analytic truths, and rationalism. The connection may be explained by the fact that a priori knowledge is typically associated with either analytic truths or rational intuition. The fourth component seems to be the kind of anti-realism associated with epistemic theories of truth, while the fifth component clearly captures a broadly externalist tendency. We will label the preceding components "anti-naturalism," "objectivism," "rationalism," "anti-realism," and "externalism." The labels are only rough approximations, however, and it is should be noted that these components are only imperfectly correlated with explicit endorsement of naturalism, rationalism, and so on.
Components six and seven must be interpreted with additional care because they differ between the analyses conducted. It is also harder to put a label on them. Component six groups the view that one dies in the teletransporter case with deontology, the A-theory of time, and the view that one should not switch in the trolley case. The views on the trolley case and on deontology have a natural connection, but the connection between these views and the views on the teletransporter and time issues is more mysterious. The seventh component is dominated by two-boxing on Newcomb's problem, upholding classical logic, and invariantism about knowledge claims. Again, it is unclear exactly what this component captures. The correlations between our two last components and identification with certain philosophers may be useful in helping to interpret those components. Table 14 shows the main correlations between background questions and the seven extracted components. The correlations between our two last components and identification with certain philosophers suggest that these components might reflect the views of these philosophers.
Metasurvey results
Of the target group, 216 philosophers responded to the Metasurvey. The lower number is not surprising, as the cognitive load of the Metasurvey is much higher than that of the Survey. Of the overall group, 727 responded. We will present the results for the target group here.
One consistent effect is that respondents greatly underestimate the number of "other"
answers. This effect may have more to do with errors about others' survey-answering psychology than about their philosophical views. To eliminate this effect, we normalize both the Survey results and individual answers to the Metasurvey questions by eliminating the "other" category and normalizing the remaining categories so they sum to 100%. In the results that follow, we compare individuals' normalized answers to the normalized Survey results. -0.12 Continental Phil.
-0.11 Table 14 : Main correlations between extracted components and (a) background, (b) philosophical identification, and (c) specialization.
Community-level results for specific answers are as indicated in Table 15 .
As well as measuring community-level effects, we can also measure mean absolute errors by individuals. For all individuals across all questions, the mean absolute error is 14.79% (σ=12.4%). Figure 4 shows the frequency of absolute error levels across all Metasurvey answers from the target faculty group (i.e. across all questions and respondents for this group).
The performance of professional philosophers outside the target faculty group was a little worse. This category includes all respondents to the Metasurvey who declared a faculty-level affiliation in philosophy or a PhD in philosophy, but were not part of the target group. The mean absolute error is 16.66 for this group (σ=14.11%). The difference between the target group and this group is statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
Metasurvey analysis
It is striking that for many of the questions, Metasurvey results show a community-level error of around 20% (see Figure 5 ). The overlap between the views best correlated with Metasurvey accuracy and the views that were most underestimated in the Metasurvey is striking. However, we did not find a significant tendency to underestimate views opposed to one's own across the whole of the Metasurvey. On the contrary, we found a statistically significant tendency to underestimate the popularity of one's views (p<0.001). Across all answers, the mean error for participants' own views is -2.52% (σ=13.08, n=4600), while it is 1.37% (σ=12.11, n=8474) for opposing views.
Summary of conclusions
There is famously no consensus on the answers to most major philosophical questions.
Still, some of the questions on the survey came closer to drawing a consensus than others.
In particular, the following views all had normalized positive answer rates of approximately 70% or more: a priori knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, non-skeptical realism, compatibilism, atheism, non-Humeanism about laws, cognitivism about moral judgment, classicism about logic, externalism about mental content, scientific realism, and trolley switching.
The Metasurvey indicates that a number of the preceding positions were not expected to reach this level of agreement: a priori knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, non-Humeanism about laws, cognitivism about moral judgment, scientific realism, and trolley switching were all predicted to achieve rates at least 15% lower. For most of these questions, respondents to the Metasurvey underestimated agreement on the leading positions. Two notable exceptions are subjectivism about aesthetic value (estimate: 67.7%, actual: 45.7%) and empiricism (estimate: 66.5%, actual: 55.7%).
The correlations and principal component analysis reported in the preceding sections suggest that philosophical views tend to come in packages. Our analysis reveals five major choice points in logical space: naturalism vs anti-naturalism, objectivism vs subjectivism, rationalism vs empiricism, realism vs anti-realism (of the kind associated with epistemic theories of truth), internalism vs externalism. Of course, the packages depend on the choice of questions, and different surveys may have yielded different packages. Still, much of one's position on the questions we asked appears to be determined by one's view on these five issues. Positions on these issues are significantly affected by respondents' professional backgrounds, their specializations, and their orientations as philosophers.
The Metasurvey suggests that philosophers often have highly inaccurate sociological beliefs. The Survey itself may contribute to the project of correcting these beliefs. Given the important roles that sociological beliefs sometimes play in philosophy, there may well be room for more surveys of the philosophical views of professional philosophers. 
